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Abstract— In recent years there has been a shift in 
emphasis from transaction-based to more co-operative 
relationships, as chain members have recognised the 
need to invest in their supply chain relationships in 
order to protect their businesses. These non-arm’s-
length relationships are capable of generating relational 
rents for chain partners. The main aim of this paper is 
to investigate why, in spite of the advantages of the non-
arm’s-length relationships, some relationships do not 
continue. To enhance the understanding of the 
termination process, we identify and analyse the factors 
inducing relationship sustainability (continuation) as 
well as termination in the case of the German wheat-to-
bread chain.  
The study built on the findings of relationship 
marketing approach that stresses the importance of 
building longer-term relationships with customers 
rather than carrying out individual transactions. In 
addition, the findings of modern microeconomic theories 
including transaction costs theory and industrial theory 
are taken into consideration. The empirical analysis is 
based on two data sets: First, a quantitative 
questionnaire survey and second, interviews with 
stakeholders of the wheat-to-bread chain were 
conducted, aiming at identifying the role of economic 
and behavioral dimensions of relationships for their 
termination.  
The questionnaire survey provides that businesses 
assess the relationships in the wheat-to-bread chain, 
being of high quality and long term duration. The 
results show that trust, satisfaction and commitment - 
the behavioural dimensions of relationships quality - are 
very high in the considered chain. Competitive price, 
competitive quality and supply continuity were 
identified as determinants mostly important for buyers’ 
satisfaction as directly influencing relationships’ 
performance. In addition, the results demonstrate that 
lack of trust is the reason why relationships do not 
develop or are terminated in the early phases of the 
relationship. In the long lasting relationships on the 
other hand, the reasons for termination are mostly of 
economic nature. 
The paper shows why sustainable relationships may 
enhance business’ competitiveness and analyses why in 
spite of it the relationships terminate. As the result of 
the research we understand the sustainable 
relationships as those relationships in that the costs 
for starting the relationship are exceeded by 
returns gained from the cooperation in time. 
Keywords— economic relationships, sustainability, 
termination  
I. INTRODUCTION  
An Eurostat ad hoc survey on inter-enterprise 
relations conducted in 2003 in the five EU-countries 
shows that enterprises view the impact of inter-
enterprise relationships on their competitiveness very 
favourably [1]. Between 60% and 70% of the 
enterprises perceived positive impact of inter-
enterprise relations on the competitiveness of their 
business over the last three years. This is driven by 
private incentives to secure market growth, gain 
market share, improve margins and increase efficiency 
in an environment characterised by greater 
competitive pressures due to increased global 
competition, EU enlargement, World Trade 
agreements, reform of the CAP and retailer 
concentration.  
Public pressure for transparency, traceability and 
due diligence throughout the food supply chain has 
also played a role. These developments influence the 
way in which inter-firm relations in agribusiness 
supply chains are managed and organised. Strategies 
ranging from complete vertical integration to 
collaborative alliances have been developed in 
attempts to establish a more competitive position for 
those involved and offer the alternative of creating a 
supply chain that moves away from the free market 
extreme of ‘open commodity trading’ that has been a 
feature of agricultural markets for so long.  
The paper draws on information collected as part of 
an EU funded project FOODCOMM. In the project, 
among other things we investigated the coordination 
forms of transactions in the German wheat-to-bread 
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chain, the quality and strength of business 
relationships as well as the factors determining 
termination of relationships in the chain. The paper 
starts by reviewing the literature on relationship types, 
quality and development. Then the empirical study 
and its results are presented. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. Benefits and costs of long-term relationships 
In the relationship marketing literature a number of 
studies have been published in recent years, studying 
the success factors of long-term relationships. This 
was the reaction to the research works expounding the 
benefits of long-term relationships for both the 
supplier and the buyer. 
The research shows that the non-arm’s-length 
relationships are capable of generating relational rents 
for chain partners. Relational rents are defined as 
profits jointly generated in an exchange relationship 
which cannot be generated by neither companies in 
isolation and can only be created through the joint 
idiosyncratic contributions of the specific alliance 
partners [2]. The economic aims of long-term 
cooperation are: to secure market growth, to gain 
market share, to improve margins and to increase 
efficiency in an environment characterised by great 
competitive pressure. Public pressure for transparency, 
traceability and due diligence throughout the food 
supply chain have also played a role.  
Long-term business relations imply not only 
additional profit but entail also extra costs. The costs 
may be classified in two categories. First, costs for 
starting a relationship (cost for locating and 
contracting new business partners). Bursk [3], 
however, argued that these expenses should be treated 
as investments, not costs. The major part of the costs 
invested in starting and continuing relationships turns 
into sunk costs after the termination of the 
relationship. In the marketing literature, these costs are 
called “switching costs” (cost for terminating a 
relationship).  
According to Press [4], switching costs are 
influenced by trust, resource specificity and 
satisfaction. The higher the sum of these three factors, 
the higher the switching costs and the higher the 
commitment to a long-term relationship. Switching 
costs are “the forgone value of investments plus 
economic penalties and other expenses associated with 
findings, evaluating, and using a new supplier” [5].  
In the long-term relationships the switching costs 
can be saved. Even though, they are not always the 
most efficient form of cooperation.  Switching costs 
count to transaction costs. The transaction costs theory 
explains, under which conditions the transaction costs 
can be reduced through vertical cooperation and under 
which condition the coordination through the spot 
market is the most efficient one. From the theoretic 
point of view, the most efficient coordination forms 
will prevail in the market if there is competition 
between enterprises that are free to choose the 
coordination form. This form has the highest 
difference between relations’ rents and costs. The 
states’ interventions in the market as for example tax 
system or subventions, however, can influence the 
coordination form in a decisive way. 
Kallfass [6] considers the option to achieve 
transaction costs savings through vertical cooperation 
between the agricultural producers and the buyers in 
Germany. He analysed, based on the transaction cost 
theory, the prevailing co-ordinations’ forms of 
transactions between business partners, namely - no 
contracts, one year contracts and several years 
contracts. He adopts an analytical framework, 
specifying quality, transportation costs, the number of 
buyers and the specificity of buyers’ investment as the 
determining factors of coordination form in 
agricultural products’ marketing. The transactions 
without contracts, used by homogenous products such 
as bread wheat, are characterised by homogenous 
goods without special qualities; the transportation 
costs play an unimportant role, the number of ex post 
buyers is high and the use of specific assets is not 
relevant. The quality uncertainties, that would increase 
the cost of spot market transaction, are reduced by the 
state norms, standards and control through 
independent agencies. The spot market is the most 
efficient marketing alternative for product markets 
with these characteristics (e. g. wheat). The one year 
contracts are most efficient for marketing of a product 
with specific qualities where the transport costs are of 
low or middle importance. There is a low number of 
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buyers in the market and the asset specific investments 
plays intermediate role (e.g. malt barley). The more 
year contracts are efficient for transaction of products 
with standard quality where transportation costs are 
highly important. There is only one, always large scale 
buyer in the region (monopsonist). The buyers’ 
investment in specific assets is very important. There 
exists relatively high mutual dependence between 
producer and buyer (e. g. sugar beets). 
B. Quality, strength and termination of economic 
relationships 
The strain of literature of relational marketing 
paradigm focuses on studying the factors influencing 
the relationship quality [7] service quality and strength 
[8, 9] as well as exploring the phenomenon of 
customers’ desired value [10]. These concepts are in 
some extent overlapping. They investigate the 
importance of different determinants of a relationship 
like trust, performance, structure, satisfaction, personal 
bonds, communication etc. for building cooperative 
relationships. Considerable theory already accounts 
for each element of a cooperative interorganizational 
relationship [11]. Roberts et al [12] retained as 
indicators of relationship quality the dimensions trust, 
satisfaction, commitment and conflict. Ganesan [13] 
suggests that long-term orientation in a buyer/seller 
relationship is a function of two main factors: mutual 
dependence and the extent to which they trust one 
another. 
The termination of a relationship is a process 
contrarian to the one of cooperation. In the previous 
research diverse terms are used interchangeably to 
specify the phenomenon of relationship ending 
(ending, termination, dissolution, switching…).We 
utilize the term relationship termination in accordance 
with Tähtinen and Halinen [14] who use the concept 
of termination “to refer to an ending where one of the 
parties, or an outside actor, deliberately ends a 
relationship.” The term thus accentuates the 
termination decision and the intentional actions to end 
the relationship.  
The research identifying and analysing the factors 
strengthening the relationship by enhancing 
relationship quality, profitability and satisfaction 
provides significant inside also in the understanding of 
termination process as this being a reverse process.   It 
is proved for example, that low level of trust 
influences the relationship quality in a negative way 
[12] and thus increases the probability of termination. 
C. Development of exchange relationships 
The most studies measure the relationship’s 
elements in a certain time point without regarding that 
relationships are evolving. Recent research, however, 
has recognised the importance of considering the 
whole relationship development in time, as the level of 
different elements varies in different phases of the 
relationships. The costs of a relationship for example 
are higher at the initial phase due to the starting 
investments that have to be provided than in the 
further phases.  The consideration of development of 
exchange relationships was putting forward during the 
past decade [15, 16, 11]. Different models were 
developed which mostly share the view that a 
relationship has a beginning, a life between and an 
ending [14]. 
 
A most influential framework for developing a 
buyer-seller relationship was proposed by Dwyer at al. 
[15]. They treat the buyer-seller exchange as an 
ongoing relationship and show that relationships 
evolve over time and are temporary. They describe 
five typical phases of a business relationship: 
 
(1)  Awareness phase. In the awareness phase, the 
identification of a possible partner and the signalling 
of the perceived attractiveness of this partner occur. 
Moreover, a shared planning of first transactions takes 
place. 
(2)  Exploration phase. In the exploration phase, 
first transactions are carried out. A critical assessment 
of the involved benefits, costs, opportunities and risks 
follows. 
(3) Expansion phase. In the expansion phase, 
further transactions are carried out. In general, this 
results in an increase in mutual dependency. 
(4)  Commitment phase. In the commitment phase 
there is a high degree of mutual dependency. At the 
same time, processes are institutionalised.  
(5) Dissolution  phase.  In the dissolution phase, 
business relationships are terminated. This is often a 
one-sided process.  
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Rousseau et al. [17 cited in 18] simplify the 
development of trusting relationships to only three 
stages: building (forming or re-forming), stability, and 
dissolution.  
III. THE STUDY 
The data for this paper was collected as part of the 
EU funded project FOODCOMM.  The data set was 
gathered in two steps.  
First, quantitative questionnaire survey of chain 
participants was conducted. The questionnaire was 
developed based on information from in-depth phone 
or face-to-face interviews with representatives of 
business associations. A web-based online survey was 
the initial approach in data collection which however 
failed.  Although remarkable publicity work was 
made, only few stakeholders in Germany filled the 
questionnaire via the internet. Therefore, 384 
questionnaires (28 farmers, 129 mills, 229 bakeries) 
were mailed to respondents along with a cover letter 
and a postage-paid return envelope. The businesses 
include different firm sizes and different relationship 
types. We received the respondents’ addresses from 
the involved associations and additionally through 
internet search.  The responds rate was very low. Only 
in case of farmers the rate was higher as farmers 
which cooperate with our institute also in other 
projects were contacted. The final sample size for the 
analysis comprises 49 responses, subdivided into 15 
wheat farmers, 15 mills and 19 bakeries (Table 1).  
Second, interviews with the wheat-to-bread chain 
stakeholders were carried out (see Table 2 for 
participant details). In these interviews we asked the 
actors, which coordination form do they prefer and 
why they terminated their exchange relationships to 
their business partners in the past and in which 
relationships’ phase. The businesses included in the 
qualitative interviews were chosen to represent a 
diversity of firm sizes and economic relationships. 
They are located in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and 
Thuringia, in the new federal states where the structure 
of agricultural businesses is completely different 
comparing to the old states. The vertical coordination 
is more supported by agricultural businesses in the 
NFS as they do not strive for independence that much 
as the family farms in the OFS do [22]. 
Table 1 German wheat-to-bread chain, sample and 
population 
Business  Sample  Whole 
Population 
Total Farms  15 245,000
Small 
(1) 9  <239,000
Large 
(2) 6  >6,000
Total processors  34 18,722
Mills 15  1,315
Bakeries 19  17,407
(1) 5-99 ha; 
(2) 100 and more ha  
Source: BVL [19]; AgriMA [20], BMELV [21] 
 
Table 2 Participant details 
Business  Business 
type  Employees Method 
Producer 
association 
cooperative   phone 
Agri-trader  large trader    phone 
Mill 1  trade 20  face-to-face 
Mill 2  trade 3,5  face-to-face 
Mill 3  industry 84  face-to-face 
Mill 4  industry 70  written 
Bakery 1  trade 4  face-to-face 
Bakery 2  trade 4  face-to-face 
Bakery 3  trade 10  face-to-face 
BÄKO*  Purchasing 
co-op 
40 phone 
Bakery 4  industry 300  phone 
* BÄKO is a very important bakery purchasing cooperative  
IV. RESULTS AND DISSCUSION 
A. Relationship types and freedom to choose them 
In the questionnaire, responding businesses 
indicated the types of relationships (choosing from 
spot markets, market transactions with same 
buyer/supplier, formal contracts and financial 
participation) they currently have with suppliers and 
buyers in the domestic market.  The most typical 
relationship type (RT) in the wheat-to-bread chain is 
market transaction with the same business partner (= 
repeated market transactions - RMT) (Table 3). 
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Table 3 Use of different relationship types (% of column 
total)  
  Stakeholder 
     Farmers      
       –> 
<–      
Processors 
Processor 
      –> 














0% 3.8%  0% 
Total   100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
* Significant difference in means, ANOVA, α=0.058 
 
Table 4 Freedom to choose relationship type  (% of column 
total)  
  Stakeholder 
  Farmers 





Yes 90.9%  100.0%  50.0% 
No      
No – member 
of  cooperative   0% 0%  0% 




9.1% 0%  25.0% 
No – because  
customers’  
buying/supplier
s’ selling  
practices 
0% 0% 25.0% 
No – because 
of legal    
requirements/re
gulations 
0% 0%  0% 
Total n 11 5  8 
 
Besides RMT farmers use in their downstream 
relationship also formal written bilateral contracts. 
Pure spot markets, transaction in which the identities 
of the business partners are largely irrelevant, are   
significantly more often used by farmers in their 
downstream business relationships than by other 
actors in the wheat-to-bread chain (F-test, α = 0.058). 
The large majority of farmers and processors in 
their upstream relationships claimed to be free to 
decide which relationship type they use (Table 4). 
Comparing to farmers, only 50% of processors in their 
relationship downstream feel free to choose the 
relationship type. As the main reasons for the lack of 
freedom they stated are insufficient bargaining power 
and customers’ buying practices.  
The approximate share of the total annual 
turnover/purchasing value generated through the 
relationship with the most important partner decreases 
while moving downstream the chain (Table 5) 
amounting to 63% at the farm level  and 39% at the 
processors in their downstream relationship. The main 
economic relationship between farmers and purchasers 
lasts in average 160 months, the one between 
processors and the main supplier - 255 months and the 
relationship between processors and purchasers 237 
months 
All main buyers of wheat are located in the same 
region as the purchasing farmers as well as 73.1% of 
main processors’ suppliers. In comparison, 
significantly lower number of main processors’ buyers 
(57.1%) are located in the same region (F-test, 
α=0.044). 
 
Table 5 Characterisation of relationship with most 
important buyer/supplier 
  Stakeholder 
  Farmers 





Approximate share in 



























* Significant difference in means, ANOVA α=0.044 
Note: in square brackets, no. of valid responses [n].  
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B. Relationship quality and strength 
All respondents assess the overall quality of the 
relationship to the main business partner as good, only 
the processors regarding their downstream relationship 
were comparatively less satisfied (Table 6). 
Relationships at all levels of the wheat-to-bread chain 
are characterised by high level of trust and 
commitment.  
Table 6 Quality of relationship with main buyer/supplier 
(assessment expressed on a 7-point rating scale (1=very 
poor, …, 7=very good)) 
  Stakeholder 
  Farmers 



















































Note: in parentheses, standard deviation (std dev); in square 
brackets, no. of valid responses [n].  
 
Farmers are satisfied with the relationship to the 
main buyer and so are the processors to the main 
supplier. Processors are just somewhat satisfied with 
the relationship to the buyer. An F-Test reveals no 
significant differences between the means of the 
statements from farmers, processors and retailers. 
The strength of the relationship with the most 
important business partner is analysed based on three 
statements (past collaboration experience, dependence 
and ability to endure conflicts) using again a 7-point 
Likert scale (Table 7). Actors at all stages see the past 
collaboration experience as good. The processors 
assess their dependency on the main buyer 
significantly higher than the farmers (F-Test, 
α=0.013). The respondents assess their ability to 
endure relationship conflicts with the buyer or supplier 
as very high. 
Table 7 Strength of relationship with main buyer/supplier 
(assessment expressed on a 7-point rating scale (1=very 
low, …, 7=very high)) 
  Stakeholder 
  Farmers 




























Our ability to endure 
relationship 











Significant difference in means, ANOVA α=0.013 
Note: in parentheses, standard deviation (std dev); in square 
brackets, no. of valid responses [n].  
 
C. Trust in different phases of  relationships 
To structure the results of qualitative interviews on 
trust, we distinguish two types of trust influencing 
relationships in the wheat-to-bread chain. We called 
the first one “personal trust”. This type of trust arises 
when the business partners like each other personally. 
The existence of this type of trust depends especially 
on quality of interpersonal communication between 
the businesses representatives. Personal trust plays the 
most important role at the beginning of a relationship 
in the awareness phase as it allows trusting the partner 
even though there is no past cooperation experience. 
Moreover, personal trust plays an important role for 
choosing a new supplier when more suppliers are 
offering equal price-performance ratio. Especially 
farmers and small trade bakers said that they will not 
cooperate with the business in case they do not like the 
representative personally. On the other hand, personal 
antipathy (the opposite of personal trust) seems to be 
seldom the reason for termination of sustainable, long 
lasting business relationships in the wheat-to-bread 
chain in Germany.  
In the case study, the respondent of BÄKO (bakery 
purchasing cooperative)  described this circumstance 
on an example of a situation when the representative 
of the long term business partner changed. The BÄKO 
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representative did not like personally the new 
representative of the business partners. Even though 
the personal trust was low to this person, due to 
successful past collaboration, BÄKO have continued 
the exchange relationship.  
The reason for continuation was the second type of 
trust, trust based on the positive past collaboration 
experience.  This type of trust enhances if partners 
objectives were satisfied in the past. To achieve the 
objectives, the inter-organisational communication 
plays an important role especially in the relationships 
between mills and industrial bakeries.  
To be able to produce high quality bread according 
to end-consumer demand, bakeries require various 
types and qualities of flour. Therefore, the need of co-
operation and communication between mills and 
bakeries concerning technical questions and 
innovations gains in importance. The enhanced co-
operation requires more investment in the relationship 
(more investment in ICT, asset specificity) and 
strengthens the relationship as the switching costs 
increase and thus the termination is more costly.  
To satisfy bakeries demand for special wheat 
qualities, the mills have to produce flour from 
homogenous and high quality wheat. For this reason, 
some mills in Germany which purchase wheat directly 
from farmers determine wheat production technology 
such as choice of varieties, fertilizer use or pest 
management. The joint cultivation technology used by 
individual farmers or farmers gathered in producers’ 
cooperatives allows achieving desired and 
homogenous wheat qualities. The control of food 
quality and traceability seems to be less costly in 
vertically cooperating food chains than by using spot 
market. The increasing demand for quality thus may 
push the development of closer long-term cooperation 
between business partners.   
D. Relationship termination 
In this section, the results of qualitative interviews 
are presented regarding relationship termination.  
The mills terminated the relationships to farmers 
mostly because of differences in price or because of 
not sufficient wheat quality ( 
Table 8). The mill that buys wheat from the agri-
traders terminates in the past the relationships because 
of price or restructuring of the trader. 
Three of four interviewed mills prefer to buy wheat 
directly from the farmers in the region than from agri-
traders. They differentiate thus the otherwise 
homogenous product wheat flour by the special 
characteristic “regional origin”. The consumers 
perceive the regional products as being safer and are 
willing to pay higher price for them. Agri-traders’ 
downstream relationships to the mills are mostly long-
term in the form of repeated transactions with the 
same seller. Written contracts are very often replaced 
by trust. The relationships mostly break down because 
of concentration process taking place in the sector. 
Processors and thus business partners disappear from 
the market when bought out by others or in the case of 
insolvency. Price can also be the reason for business 
termination when there is a better option to sell on the 
market. So for example, due to price agreement 
between traders, the price in the region can be lower 
than in other regions in Germany. Therefore, some 
farmers sell cereals to external traders who offer 
higher prices. 
Relationships between mills and flour’s buyers were 
terminated mostly because of price, whereas the 
quality also played a role, also the distance did. 
  Mill 4 “long distances reduce flexibility” 
In general, the trade persons are interested in long 
term relationships. When a supplier offers competitive 
price and quality products and is able to assure supply 
continuity, which are factors influencing profitability, 
then the trade enterprises will not change the supplier. 
The reasons for the termination of relationships are 
mostly the not competitive price or product quality.  
 
Baker (3) “we have cooperated for 18 years, but we 
broke up for some time in the meantime which was caused 
by not satisfying flour quality”.  
 Baker (4) “12 years ago, we had to cancel cooperation 
with a mill as the flour quality was not constant” 
 Baker (1): “There were some businesses relationships 
terminated in the past, once a small company got into 
economic troubles and could not deliver to the agreed 
volume, so we terminated the cooperation and ordered the 
products by BÄKO….”   8 
 
Table 8 Reasons for suppliers’ relationships termination in the past / downstream relationships 
  Supplier    after long cooperation  after short 
cooperation 
   Duration 
(years) 
Price    Quality  Supply 
continuity 





 Spot  market           
Mill 1  80,0%  
farmers 
20   Termination never happened 
Mill 2  100% 
farmers 
   x       
Mill 3  99,8% 
agritrader 
up to 15   x      x   
Mill 4  100% 
farmers 
 x  x       
Bakery 1  private 
supplier 
     x    x 
Bakery 2  private 
supplier 
   x       
Bakery 3  private 
supplier 
         x 
BÄKO  various 
suppliers 





   x       
 
Table 9 Reasons for buyers’ relationships termination in the past / upstream relationships 





Mill 1  45% BÄKO 
55% bakeries 
10-15 years with 
trade  
4-5 years with 
industry 
x       






      
Mill 3  70% industry 
bakeries 
long term   x         




since ca. 5 – 10 
years 
x x    long distances 
make inflexible  
 
 
The previous length of the relationship does not 
seem to have an impact on the decision to change if 
the relationship is not profitable any more. 
Relationships between large scale purchasers and 
suppliers are long term and based on trust. This 
means that when co-operation between large scale 
businesses and their suppliers lasts for long, the   
contracts are not written any more as they can be 
substituted with trust. The relationships are 
terminated rarely. The reason for this is seldom 
personal antipathy. If relationships are terminated, 
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then this is mostly because the supplier is not able to 
supply at a competitive price and quality anymore or 
cannot assure supply continuity. Another reason is 
acquisition of the partner’s company by other 
enterprises or its insolvency. 
BÄKO terminates the relationships with suppliers 
rarely. The most common reason for loosing 
business partners is insolvency or giving up of the 
business. Another reason is that the supplier cannot 
offer a competitive price anymore. That means that 
commercial reward is lower than it could be in an 
alternative relationship.  
Even in the relationships between large scale 
purchasers and suppliers, the previous length of the 
relationship does not seem to have an impact on the 
decision to change if the relationship is not 
profitable anymore.  
It is for sure, that every relationship will be 
terminated either in near or far future nevertheless 
the reason. When can we, then, define a relationship 
as a sustainable one?  Next, we make an effort to 
answer this question using the results of this 
research.  
 When the economic outcome is lower in the 
relationship compared to market alternatives 
(alternative partner or market transaction), the 
relationship causes opportunity costs. These are the 
“costs of relationship” (switching costs + cost of 
lower service quality comparing to market 
alternatives). 
When the outcome of exchange through a 
relationship is higher than it would be by using 
market alternatives, the partners gain benefits from 
the exchange relationship. In Figure 1, the 
performance of the observed relationship in the 
single phases is depicted by the continuous curve, 
the possible performance of exchange with market 
alternatives by the dashed line. The one-side 
idiosyncratic time and adaptation investments peak 
early in the relationship, but are consistently lower 
in every stage thereafter [11] as at the first two 
phases of the relationship the starting cost has to be 
invested. The relationships that are terminated in the 
awareness or exploration phases cause opportunity 
costs for the business partners. The reason for 
termination in these phases of relationships is 
usually lack of trust. It can be expected, thus, that 
through such relationships the partners could not 
gain benefits in future. Also in the next phases of 
relationships the relationship may cause costs. These 
are mostly the cost of low service quality comparing 
to market alternatives. To asses the economic output 
of relationship (economic output = gains – costs), 
the relationships’ outcome has to be considered in 
the whole duration time. 
In the sustainable relationships the costs for starting 
the relationship will be exceed by returns gained 
from the cooperation in time. In the relationships 
where the switching costs are low (farmers, bakery 
trade), this condition can be usually achieved faster 
than in the relationships with high switching costs 
(e. g. large industrial enterprises like mills or 
industrial bakeries). 
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Performance 
Cost of low service quality 
comparing to market 
alternatives 
 
Figure 1: Relationship’s development, performance and termination. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The results both of the survey and the qualitative 
case study revealed that the majority of the actors in 
the German wheat-to-bread chain are satisfied with 
the quality of their business relationships. This 
shows that actors in the chain are flexible. They 
have the possibility to choose the relationship type 
which enables them to maximize profit under given 
structural conditions.  
On the one hand, the results illustrate that a 
significant majority of businesses prefer long-term 
business relationships. This attitude supports the 
strengthening of the business relationships in the 
chain. On the other hand, striving for independence 
is a key driver for non-contracting coordination of 
transactions. Independent businesses prefer to 
transact without being formally bound to their 
exchange partner. In the German wheat-to-bread 
chain the farmers are the players seeking for 
independency the most. Even small craft bakeries 
usually do not utilize contracts and value their 
independence. However, they usually do not use 
spot market with various partners. They mostly use 
repeated transactions with the same supplier for their 
purchasing activities. Transactions with the same 
supplier are long-term relationships without any 
contract obligations. The partners, thus, stay 
independent. In the same time, they use the 
advantages of the long term cooperation that 
contribute to transaction costs reduction. 
The reasons for termination of long term 
relationships (both with and without contracts) are 
mostly the price, quality, supply continuity and 
structural changes. The low trust was stated as being 
the reason for termination of only relationships in 
their awareness and exploration phase.  
Two types of trust influencing relationships in the 
wheat-to-bread chain could be distinguished. The 
first one is “personal trust”. This type of trust arises 
when the business partners like each other 
personally. The existence of this type of trust 
depends especially on quality of interpersonal 
communication between the business 
representatives. Personal trust plays the most 
important role at the beginning of a relationship as it 
allows trusting the partner even though there is no 
past cooperation experience. Moreover, personal 
trust plays an important role for choosing a new 
supplier when more suppliers are offering equal 
price-performance ratio. Especially farmers and 
small trade bakers stated that they will not cooperate 
with the business in case they do not like the 
representative personally. On the other hand, 
personal antipathy (the opposite of personal trust) is 
seldom the reason for termination of sustainable, 
long lasting business relationships in the wheat-to-
bread chain in Germany. The reason for 
continuation in such a case is the second type of 
trust, trust based on the positive past collaboration 
Investments/ sunk costs 
/switching cost from previous 
relationships 
Awareness Exploration Expansion  Commitment  Dissolution 
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experience.   This type of trust increases if partners’ 
objectives were satisfied in the past. By achieving 
the objectives, the inter-organisational 
communication plays an important role especially in 
the relationships between mills and industrial 
bakeries. In these relationships, the required flour 
quality has to be consulted, product information 
assuring traceability has to be exchanged and price 
and supply conditions have to be negotiated. 
As the result of the research, we understand 
sustainable relationships as those relationships in 
which the costs for starting the relationship are 
exceeded by returns gained from the cooperation in 
time. In the relationships where the switching costs 
are low (farmers, bakery trade), this condition can 
be usually achieved faster that in the relationships 
with high switching costs (e. g. large industrial 
enterprises like mills of industrial bakeries). 
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